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ABSTRACT 
 
We model the production and use of knowledge investment and show how the 
model can be used to infer the unknown price of knowledge using two 
approaches. The first is often used by national accounting offices and is based on 
costs in the knowledge-producing sector.  We show this implicitly assumes no 
market power and no productivity in the production of knowledge. We set out an 
alternative approach that focuses on the downstream knowledge-using sector, the 
final output sector. The science policy practice of using the GDP deflator is a 
simple variant of this approach, while the full approach allows market power and 
implies backing out the price of R&D from final output prices, factor costs, and 
TFP.  We estimate a R&D price for the United Kingdom from 1985 to 2005 using 
the full approach.  The index falls strongly relative to the GDP deflator suggesting 
conventionally-measured real R&D is substantially understated.  
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Constructing a Price Deflator for R&D:  Calculating the  
Price of Knowledge Investments as a Residual 
“The value of an idea lies in the using of it.” 
Thomas Alva Edison 
 
International guidelines (SNA 2008) call for capitalizing R&D in national accounting systems, a 
welcome move, but one that raises vexing measurement issues.  A major issue—perhaps the 
major issue at this point—is how to construct a price deflator for R&D.  Currently there are quite 
a few candidates:  (1) R&D often is equated with knowledge production, and an education 
deflator could be used.  (2) Science policy analysts long have used the GDP deflator to deflate 
R&D, and national accountants could continue and enrich that practice.  (3) National accountants 
could regard R&D as they regard other ―hard to measure‖ outputs and use an input cost deflator, 
perhaps adjusted for productivity.  (4) Finally, given the development of the R&D marketplace 
via the licensing of patents and the like, national accountants could obtain a price deflator by 
dividing revenue in the R&D marketplace by a quantity index of patents or scientists. 
 This paper sets out a framework that can be used to discuss and evaluate alternative price 
measures for knowledge investment; the framework is then used to construct a price index for 
private R&D in the United Kingdom from 1985 to 2005.  The model and framework we develop 
is applicable to commercial knowledge investments more generally (i.e., investments in 
intangible assets as in Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel 2009, and Marrano, Haskel, and Wallis 2009, 
Haskel et al. 2009, Corrado and Hulten 2010, among others) and to measuring R&D price 
indexes for other countries.  
The Edison quote above captures the basic notion behind the models and price estimates reported 
in this paper.  We argue the four candidates can be reduced to two basic approaches: one we call 
the ―upstream‖ approach in that it attempts to model and measure the knowledge production 
process itself, and the other we call the ―downstream‖ approach that—in the spirit of the Edison 
quote—infers the price of knowledge investment from the fruits of the innovation process, total 
factor productivity (TFP). 
 2 
 
Innovation arguably is a routine function within business these days (Baumol 2002).  For some 
ongoing, existing firms, the business function devoted to innovation is explicit as the R&D or 
marketing or development department.  In others, the function is less centralized or based on 
employee time, as in CEO Eric Schmidt‘s famous 80/20 rule at Google.1  For entrepreneurial 
start-up businesses, almost by definition, high fractions of activity are devoted to innovation, 
broadly defined.  Accordingly, we model aggregate business output as emanating from two 
sectors: one, the aggregate behavior of business functions devoted to innovation and R&D, and 
the other, an operations and/or producing sector consisting of all other business functions.
2
   
In the first use of the model, we show how the price of the commercially-produced knowledge is 
related to measured output prices, factor costs, and productivity in the operations sector.  We 
compare and contrast this ―downstream‖ approach to the ―upstream‖ approach typically favored 
by statistical agencies, and we relate both approaches to the endogenous growth model of Romer 
(1990) in which markups of self-produced knowledge capital play a critical role.  After 
considering how key aspects of innovation types (e.g., breakthrough vs. incremental innovations) 
and imperfect competition (e.g., markups) impact the modeling and measurement of output 
prices for innovation, we conclude such prices are implicitly in measured downstream sector 
productivity, that is, the value of resources devoted to innovative activity can be inferred from 
their use in business operations.   
Because productivity as conventionally measured includes a contribution from the innovation 
sector, the second use of our model frames how to tease this contribution out of standard 
productivity data.  Of course, conventional wisdom is that all sustained increases in TFP are due 
to innovation because of spillover effects.
3
  And even though data constrain us to concentrate on 
                                                          
1
 Known as the ―Pareto principle‖ in management, this refers to Google‘s ITO (Innovation Time Out) policy that 
employees are encouraged to spend 80 percent of their time on core projects and 20 percent on ―innovation‖ 
activities that pique their own interests. 
2
 Business functions are entire classes of activity within a company.  See Brown (2008) for further information on 
the use of business functions as a classification scheme for statistics on business activity.  
3
 This view has its roots in the production function approach to R&D, in which all productivity growth is related to 
all expenditures on R&D (Griliches 1979, p. 93).  Of course the view ignores the productivity-enhancing effects of 
public infrastructure, the climate for business formation, and the fact that R&D is not all there is to innovation, but 
nonetheless the view that TFP reflects the fruits of the business innovation process is acknowledged to be generally 
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estimating a price index for commercial R&D investments (rather than all investments in 
innovation), we still find that a substantial fraction of observed productivity change in the UK 
market sector emanates from its conduct of R&D.  We obtain this result by exploiting the 
recursive nature of our model and the heterogeneity in R&D intensity by industry.  The result 
impacts the estimated investment price index for UK R&D, the central estimate of which falls 
7.5 percent per year from 1985 to 2005.   
Our falling price index reflects both the success of industrial R&D (including spillovers) and the 
impact of innovations in the R&D process itself.  Indeed, available evidence suggests technical 
progress in the ―production of innovation‖ has been substantial.  Consider how computer-
enabled combinatorial chemistry has drastically lowered the costs of pharmaceutical 
experimentation, how computer-aided design has lowered product development times for items 
such as semiconductors, motor vehicles—even the British Museum‘s tessellated glass ceiling—
and how the Internet has promoted academic collaboration and productivity (Adams, Black, 
Clemmons, and Stephan 2005; Ding, Levin, Stephan, and Winkler 2010) and made huge 
amounts of information available more or less for free.   
Why is our finding of a falling price index for R&D of interest?  Many advanced industrialized 
countries are concerned by the stagnation of their nation‘s R&D spending in relation to their 
GDP.  But if the real price of R&D relative to GDP is falling, information in nominal terms is a 
misleading indicator.  As we show below, with our new price index, the contribution of R&D 
capital deepening to the growth in output per hour in the UK remains substantial even though 
nominal R&D spending relative to GDP is flat/falling.   
This paper proceeds as follows: In the next section, we set out the model and show how it can be 
used to infer the unknown price of commercial knowledge investments using two approaches.  
We then consider a host of theoretical and practical issues that confront the empirical application 
of each approach, and finally we turn to measurement and conclude.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
more right than wrong. The view is an important element of the approach used to develop an innovation index for 
the UK (Haskel, et al. 2009). 
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1. Theoretical Framework 
This section sets out a theoretical framework that can be used to discuss and evaluate alternative 
price measures for commercial knowledge investments such as R&D.  We start with a very 
simple model to show the main arguments of our approach and how it compares with other 
methods.  We then explore the robustness of the model and approach to relaxing certain 
assumptions.  
1.1 The model  
We posit a market economy with two sectors—knowledge-producing and knowledge-using—
and three factors of production—labor, capital, and knowledge.  The knowledge-producing (or 
upstream) sector generates new knowledge ( )N  using service flows from labor ( )NL , capital
( )NK , and a stock of existing knowledge, denoted NR . 
The stock of existing knowledge is superscripted by N because the knowledge used in the 
producing sector is assumed to be different from that in the using (or downstream) sector.  
Although we elaborate more fully on this assumption below, a simple way of thinking about the 
distinction is to suppose that the upstream sector uses ―basic‖ or ―unfinished‖ knowledge and 
transforms it into commercialised or ―finished‖ knowledge.  The finished knowledge is then 
employed in the production of goods and services by the downstream sector.  We further assume 
that all basic knowledge is free, from universities say, and determined outside the model.  In a 
subsequent section we relax some of these assumptions. 
The production function for the upstream industry and corresponding accounting equation for 
factor payments is written as follows: 
 ( , , , );
N N N N N L N K N
t t t t t t t t t tN F L K R t P N P L P K    (1)  
where N is newly-produced appropriable knowledge and LP and KP are prices per unit of labor 
and capital input, respectively.  There are no payments to NR  because its services are free.    
The downstream sector produces consumption and investment goods ( )Y C I   by renting 
service flows of labor ( )YL , capital ( )YK , and a stock of finished commercial knowledge, 
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denoted YR .  The stock of finished knowledge is the accumulated output of the upstream sector, 
which is assumed to grow with the production of N via the perpetual inventory model:  
 1(1 )
R
t t tR N R     (2) 
The term R  is the rate of decay of appropriable revenues from the conduct of commercial 
knowledge production.
4
   
The production function and flow equations in the downstream sector are  
            ( , , , );
Y Y Y Y Y L Y K Y R Y
t t t t t t t t t t t tY F L K R t P Y P L P K P R                              (3) 
where RP is the price of renting a unit of the finished knowledge stock (e.g., a license fee for a 
patent or blueprint).  The relationship between NP , the price of a unit of newly-produced finished 
knowledge (an investment or asset price) and the price of renting a unit of the same knowledge is 
given by the user cost relation  
                                     
             ( )   R N N Rt tP P                                                       (4) 
where N  is the real rate of return in sector N and taxes are ignored.  Recalling that sector Y
includes the production of investment goods I , equations similar to (2) and (4) for tangible 
capital but expressed in terms of , , , , and 
Y Y K K IK I P P   (instead of  , , , , and Y N R R NR N P P  ) 
complete the model.  
We are now in a position to understand two broad approaches, upstream and downstream, to 
modelling R&D prices.  Log differentiation of the income flow equations and dropping time 
subscripts gives the following price duals: 
 ln ln ln ln
N K K L L N
N NP s P s P TFP        (5)
 ln ln ln ln ln
Y K K L L R R Y
Y Y YP s P s P s P TFP         (6) 
                                                          
4
 This concept of depreciation was introduced and applied to private R&D by Pakes and Schankerman (1984). 
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The ―s‖ terms are factor income shares for labor, capital, and knowledge calculated for each 
sector in the usual way from equations (1) and (3), respectively. The terms ln NTFP  and 
ln YTFP  are the change in total factor productivity for each sector, i.e., the shift in each sector‘s 
production function.  The interpretation of the sector productivities and their relationship to 
aggregate productivity for the economy as a whole is discussed in a subsequent section.   
1.2 Upstream method: data from the R&D-performing sector 
Consider equation (5).  Most statistical agencies have survey data on the R&D business function 
of R&D-performing firms; thus, existing surveys give us information on the first two terms in 
equation (5).  But equation (5) also shows that productivity in the R&D sector ln NTFP  is 
needed to estimate prices for R&D, and information on this quantity is very scant indeed. 
Economists long have studied the impact of R&D on productivity, but quantitative studies of 
productivity in the R&D process itself are fairly rare.  Studies of the impact of the Internet were 
mentioned previously.  Agrawal and Gort (2001) show that product development times shortened 
steadily from 1887 to 1985, suggesting improvements in R&D productivity are somewhat of a 
norm.  And Mokyr (2007, p. 1154) states ―In the past, the practical difficulty of solving 
differential equations limited the application of theoretical models to engineering. A clever 
physicist, it has been said, is somebody who can rearrange the parameters of an insoluble 
equation so that it does not have to be solved. Computer simulation can evade that difficulty and 
help us see relations in the absence of exact closed-form solutions ... In recent years simulation 
models have been extended to include the effects of chemical compounds on human bodies. 
Combinatorial chemistry and molecular biology are both equally unimaginable without fast 
computers.‖  
The upstream approach is the dominant approach used by statistical agencies.
5
  In its most basic 
form, the method assumes, in (5), that ln 0NTFP  and uses only share-weighted input costs to 
measure output price change.  This variant has been used by both the UK Office of National 
Statistics (ONS) and US Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) to approach the measurement of 
                                                          
5
 In what follows, we review recent work in statistical agencies; for a review of the earlier literature on R&D 
deflators, see Cameron (1996).  The very recent release of the US BEA/NSF Satellite Account on June 25 is not 
considered. 
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R&D prices, e.g. Galindo-Rueda (2007) and one of the approaches reported in Copeland, 
Medeiros and Robbins (2007).
6
   A more refined variant, referred to in Fixler (2009) as scenario 
B, assumes a rate of TFP growth that is subtracted from share-weighted change in input costs, 
much as in equation (5).  Finally, a related approach proposed by Copeland and Fixler (2009) is 
based on modeling the R&D services industry (US NAICS 5417, UK SIC 73.1); they suggest 
these ―market-based‖ results can be used to proxy for all (i.e., in-house) private business R&D.7   
The Copeland-Fixler price index increases a bit less than overall private R&D input costs and, 
taken literally, suggests ln NTFP  averaged 0.1 percentage point per year from 1987 to 2004.  
The plausibility of this result and interpretation is discussed below.
8
   More fundamentally, the 
premise of the approach—using the R&D services industry to generate results for all private 
R&D—requires scrutiny.  Some NAICS 5417 industry revenues are for contract research whose 
character may be inconsistent with the standard definition of R&D.  And the establishment-based 
industry classification may place a nontrivial number of company-owned R&D laboratories in 
the R&D services industry, in which case industry ―revenue‖ will not be entirely market-based.  
Given the development of the R&D marketplace via the sales and licensing of patents, national 
accountants could strengthen the upstream approach by urging statisticians to collect data on unit 
sales and license fees for patent and other intellectual property rights (IPRs).  But one must note 
that such observations could correspond to RP , or to NP , or to (1 )
R NP  (the latter when data 
are for units of R  of age  that obsolesce at the rate 
R  per period), suggesting just some 
                                                          
6
 Despite its drawbacks this approach has the advantage of consistency as it is widely used in recent efforts to 
produce R&D satellite accounts in other countries. The method also is used in areas where no market transaction 
data exist, such as measurement of own-account software investment in the UK, as well as much of government 
output and other hard-to-measure areas such as education services in many countries. 
7
 The Copeland-Fixler approach is to back out price change from changes in the industry‘s sales ( )S  less changes in 
quantities of the industry‘s output.  If one is willing to assume that the number of workers ( )SCIENTISTS and patents
( )Z proxy for the quantity of R&D output in NAICS 5417, then their approach, expressed in our notation, is 
5417 5417 5417
ln ln .5*( ln ln )
N
P S Z SCIENTISTS       . 
8
 As practical matter we also note that the result partly rests on the assumption that output per worker is unchanged 
over time, an assumption that is difficult to accept for a technology-intensive activity such as R&D.  To improve the 
validity of the Copeland-Fixler approach, it may be worthwhile adjusting the number of workers for changes in 
composition (or ―quality‖) via marginal-product weighting.  
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hurdles to be crossed in working with data from the IPR marketplace.  Indeed, existing revenue 
data for the R&D services industry are likely confounded by these same issues. 
1.3 Downstream method: data from the R&D-using sector 
An alternative approach is to consider the downstream or R&D-using sector.  Manipulation of 
equation (6) shows that it can be re-written as:  
           
ln ln ln ln
ln
Y K K L L Y
R Y Y
R
Y
P s P s P TFP
P
s
      
   
 
                    (7) 
which says that the unknown ln RP can be inferred from final-output price changes, net of 
changes in other input costs and offset by the sector‘s TFP.  Because we have suppressed the 
dynamics that give rise to differences in the time paths of NP and RP , the unknown ln NP  will 
be equal to ln RP  given constancy of 
R and R .   
In practice, we have many R&D-using industries.  If R&D were a homogeneous good, the price 
from any one of them will do or one might combine prices from a number of downstream 
industries together to give a ―grand‖ index, *ln RP , a weighted average of R&D rental prices 
across those industries 
         *
1
ln ln ln ln
ln
Y K K L L YJ
R i iY i iY i i
i R
i iY
P s P s P TFP
P
s


      
   
 

  
 (8) 
where there are J  R&D-using industries; each industry is indexed by i ; and i  is a weight to be 
determined.  
In its most general form, the downstream approach infers R&D prices from output prices (such 
as GDP prices) and is the most common approach used in analyzing R&D data for science policy 
analysis.  It is a method that follows the Edison logic.  Moreover, a specific approach in 
Copeland, Medeiros, and Robbins (2007) is an even closer cousin of equation (8) than the GDP 
deflator.  This is the BEA price index for R&D used in their R&D satellite account; it is 
calculated as the weighted aggregate 
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                        ln lnN Yi iP P                                                                          (9)                                                        
across the most intensive R&D-using sectors with j the j
th
 industry‘s share of total R&D 
investment.  Equation (8) shows, however, that science-policy analysts and Copeland, Medeiros, 
and Robbins (2007) ignore the denominator and implicitly assume changes in the downstream 
sector‘s share-weighted factor prices and productivity net to zero.   
The downstream approach requires information on the sector‘s productivity change, ln
Y
TFP . 
This will differ from the usual productivity measure because services from the stock of 
commercial knowledge are modelled as an input to the economy‘s core operations and attributed 
to the upstream sector.  This service flow can be thought of as a Hicksian shift in the sector‘s 
standard labor/capital production function for the period during which each unit of knowledge 
remains commercially viable.  While a host of factors determine the size of this effect (and some 
will be discussed in the next section), what matters in this model is that returns to appropriable 
inventive activity are allocated to the upstream sector.   
In terms of the salient drivers established in the productivity literature, our model views the 
distinction between the sectoral productivities as follows:  Upstream productivity includes the 
appropriated returns to R&D, spillovers from public R&D, and the efficacy of the overall R&D 
process, whereas downstream productivity includes spillovers from freely available commercial 
knowledge (i.e., diffusion), as well as phenomena we associate with operations efficiency (e.g., 
economies of scale and services delivery improvements, etc.) that are unrelated to R&D. 
2. Theoretical issues 
This paper uses the downstream method.  The simple model of the previous section has been 
designed to set out the broad intuition of the approach and illustrate its relation to other recent 
work.  To carry on with the application requires reviewing a number of practical theoretical 
issues to which we now turn. 
2.1. Use of knowledge in each sector 
How robust is our assumption that the N sector uses free ―unfinished‖ or basic knowledge, NR , 
and the Y sector rents ―finished‖ knowledge, YR ?  A number of points are worth making.  First, 
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of course, if the final-output sector also uses free unfinished knowledge (that is, in addition to 
renting of finished knowledge produced by the N sector), nothing changes.  The contribution of 
the free part of knowledge to production in the downstream sector shows up in  lnTFP Y.   
Second, one might extend the model and assume that the N sector also uses ―finished‖ 
knowledge, as an input for example into producing more finished knowledge.  But then the 
problem arises of how to define the total stock of finished knowledge when both sectors draw 
from it. We cannot define each sector as renting from the entire pool of knowledge, because then 
we would implicitly be allowing the same knowledge to be ―rented twice‖ which results in an 
overstatement.  Although some studies suggest very large private returns to R&D, still others 
suggest little more than competitive returns when consideration also is given to measuring the 
rate of decline in the value of the underlying R&D asset, i.e., the rate of depreciation in (2). 
We have already assumed that knowledge is partially nonrival.  A useful direction at this point 
therefore is to think about how we pay, for example, for Microsoft Office and how we might 
distinguish between knowledge in ―platforms‖ and in ―versions,‖ a form of the breakthrough 
versus incremental distinction in innovation analysis.  Suppose the N sector uses a large quantity 
of resources to produce a knowledge platform from which it supplies versions to the Y sector 
every year (e.g., Microsoft creates Word and then leases Word 2003 version 1, version 2, etc. 
each year).  In this case, the one-year leasing of a version does not generate any lasting asset held 
in the Y sector and so these payments are intermediates (just as payments by a cinema owner 
who rents a film to show for a month are treated as intermediates rather than rentals to the 
knowledge capital in the film industry).   
But this does not necessarily mean that there is no stock of appropriable knowledge, or that there 
are just intermediate payments that net out.  Rather we can think of the upstream sector as 
retaining ownership of the knowledge asset in its ―inventory‖ or ―product platform portfolio.‖  
As an asset, the platform both earns a return (say at the rate R NP  per unit of R each period, 
equivalent to the value each unit adds to current production) plus it generates a flow of income 
via payments by the downstream sector for rentals of each version.  If the version rentals are at 
the rate 
R NP  per unit of R  (that is less than the full rental value of the stock of R ), then the 
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knowledge asset is not being ―rented twice‖ and the aggregate payment to R remains as given by 
equation (4).  This argument could be made more formal, but the logic is simple:  The N  sector 
must implicitly pay something (to itself) to rent the knowledge in its platform in order to have 
the resources to create version after version.  Equivalently, the N  sector cannot charge the full 
rental equivalence suggested by (4) for versions because the full knowledge capital inheres in the 
platform, and only partially in the versions.   
2.2 Market power in the upstream sector 
This issue was considered by Romer (1990), who assumed innovators practiced monopoly 
pricing.  Our model is similar to his:  he has three sectors.  The ideas sector uses all knowledge in 
the economy freely as an input into ideas.  Those ideas are then converted by the design sector 
into blueprints, knowledge which is appropriable and sold at a monopoly price to the production 
sector that uses blueprints as an intermediate good.  Thus in our model it is the upstream, or 
innovation/R&D sector that can be thought of as the design sector who produces blueprints; in 
our language, they produce finished ideas that can be used in the output sector. Thus designs are 
rival and appropriable (at least for a time), and they are sold at the monopoly price to the 
production sector.  Romer notes the ―design‖ sector can of course be in-house. 
Copeland and Fixler (2009) also state that uncertainty and market power are endemic in the 
research sector, by which they mean that although there is a correlation between the output and 
input prices of R&D, this relationship is highly non-linear and it is not possible to establish a 
linear approximation of R&D prices using input costs (see their Appendix B).  As a concrete 
example, Copeland and Fixler follow Romer and model the innovator as a monopolistic 
competitor with respect to other innovators, which suggests the output price is above marginal 
production cost.  In Romer the innovator‘s price is given by P MC , where MC  is the 
marginal cost of producing a new good and   is the markup, a function of the good‘s price 
elasticity of demand (Romer 1990, un-numbered equations at the top of page S87).   
Romer goes on to formulate the intertemporal zero-profit constraint, whose solution equates the 
instantaneous excess of revenue over marginal production cost as just sufficient to cover the 
interest cost of the innovation investment (equations 6 and 6', page S87).  How does this result 
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relate to the framework in this paper?  Let us follow Romer and assume that product market 
power is located in the upstream sector.
9
  In other words, the downstream sector, which uses the 
innovation, is competitive while the upstream sector, which produces the innovation, is a 
(temporary) monopolist.  Under these assumptions, in our model, downstream producers are 
price-takers for knowledge.   
If downstream marginal production costs are expressed as competitive payments to the usual 
factors of production  and Y YL K , then final output prices are indeed marked up over such costs—
but not necessarily because of imperfect competition.  Denoting the competitive factor costs of 
core operations as  ( )
Y Y L Y K YC F P L P K   where YC is the weighted-average cost of the usual 
inputs per unit of final output, then the producer markup in our model is expressed as 
Y YP C , 
with the markup given by 
                                    1
(1 )RYs
 

         .                                                                      (10) 
In this way, section 1‘s expressions for downstream factor payments (3) and price dual (6) still 
hold.  We show this by moving from the producer markup relation given by (10) to the 
downstream factor payments identity as follows: 
                                       
      
Y Y Y
Y Y R Y
L Y K Y R Y
P Y C F
C F P R
P L P K P R

 
  
              .                                              (11) 
This result establishes consistency of our framework with models of imperfect competition with 
producer markups and intertemporal zero profits, e.g., the equilibrium model of Rotemberg and 
Woodford (1995).  Moreover, even if the knowledge price faced by the downstream sector is not 
the competitive price, as long as the downstream sector is a price-taker, the dual price equation 
for the downstream sector, which is what the downstream method relies upon, can still be written 
as equation (6).  
                                                          
9
 The same assumption is made in Aghion and Howitt (2007), among others. 
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If the price of knowledge faced by the downstream sector is not the competitive price due to 
imperfect competition in the upstream sector (innovator markups), the factor shares in that sector 
will be biased measures of output elasticities in which case measured ln NTFP as 
conventionally calculated is a biased measure of ―true‖ technical progress (e.g., see Hulten 
2009).  The implausibly small average annual percent change in R&D productivity implied by 
the Copeland-Fixler upstream approach as calculated  (conventionally) and reported in section 
1.2 of the paper is therefore theoretically invalid in the presence of innovator markups, as 
Copeland and Fixler themselves would and do argue.  By contrast, as we show below, the 
downstream approach yields a measure of ln NTFP even in the presence of innovator markups. 
2.3 Market power in the downstream sector 
Suppose there is market power in the downstream sector as well.  Recalling that ln YTFP  
represents the contribution of knowledge that is freely available to all competitors, a shorthand 
for considering imperfect competition is to modify this term in equation (6).  As written, changes 
in TFP pass through one-for-one to changes in output prices.  If factor prices are exogenous, this 
is consistent with a competitive model of process innovations whereby any process innovator 
immediately lowers her output prices to undercut rivals, and the competitive equilibrium is that 
all such TFP changes are passed through 100 percent.     
A simple way to represent imperfect competition in the downstream industry is to pre-multiply 
ln YTFP  by (1 ) , where 0   is perfect competition (100% pass through) and 0   
indicates monopoly power.  That is, we write: 
                                  (12) 
to incorporate the impact of imperfect competition in the downstream industry.  A monopolistic 
downstream industry with significant barriers to entry would have ζ = 1 in which downstream 
R&D monopolist users appropriate all returns to process R&D (productivity gains) via pricing 
power.   
ln ln ln (1 ) ln
ln
Y K K L L Y
R Y Y
R
Y
P s P s P TFP
P
s
        
   
 
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In our discussion of equation (8) in section 1.3, we indicated that BEA has made use of a 
downstream method, but that an implicit assumption that factor costs and TFP net to zero was 
made via calculating an R&D price index as equation (9).  Equation (12) suggests another way of 
thinking about the BEA index, namely, that the implicit netting may also reflect an implicit 
assumption about the degree of downstream monopoly power. 
2.4 Product quality 
Upstream production also leads to product-quality innovation in the downstream sector.  If final 
output prices are not quality-adjusted, the true model written in terms of the quality adjusted-
price, 
*
ln
Y
P , is as follows:  
 
* *1 1ln ( ln ln ln ln ) ( ln ln )R Y K K L L Y Y YY YR R
Y Y
P P s P s P TFP P P
s s
            (13) 
 
where true productivity change *ln YTFP has been calculated using quality-adjusted prices. 
Equation (13) suggests that if quality is improving, *ln lnY YP P   and a negative bias may be 
imparted to estimates of ln .RP     
But the exact bias also depends the relationship between 
*ln and ln .Y YTFP TFP    In the Hulten 
(2009) steady-state quality ladder model, 
 
* *ln ln ( ln ln )  .Y Y Y YTFP TFP P P        (14)      
Equation (14) says that the measurement error from not quality-adjusting ln YP  (and hence mis-
measuring 
*
ln
Y
TFP ) cancels out, rendering ln RP  an unbiased steady-state measure even with 
unobserved product quality improvement.  
2.5 Sector productivities and markups in the steady state 
The foregoing places imperfect competition in the upstream sector.  We now explore the 
relationships among the sector productivities ln  and  ln
N RTFP TFP   and the relative value of 
resources devoted to innovation—the innovation intensity
N
Ys —in the presence of upstream 
markups.  
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Let the innovator markup over (competitive) upstream factor costs be given by 1  .  
Continuing with the simplified notation of 2.2, the value of upstream output then becomes 
 
N N NP N C F  (15) 
where N NC F is the cost of the conduct of innovation/R&D in terms of the standard factors of 
production (labor and tangible capital) at competitive factor prices ( )
N N L N K NC F P L P K  .  
Changes in the price and quantity elements of N NC F refer to the per unit share-weighted input 
costs and share-weighted input quantities denoted as ln NC and ln NF , respectively.10  
Upstream productivity is then given by: 
                             ln ln lnN NTFP N F                                                       (16) 
and downstream sector productivity is given by 
                            ln ln (1 ) ln ln
Y R Y R Y
Y YTFP Y s F s R            .      (17) 
The upstream price dual now becomes 
 ln ln
N N NP C TFP     (18) 
whereas the downstream sector‘s factor payments and price dual remain as given in section 1.   
How do innovator markups and sector productivities relate to (a) our previous discussion of the 
Romer model, (b) the literature on intangible capital that would include R&D co-investments in 
NP N and (c) actual measured productivity growth in an economy?  First, equation (17) follows 
from our earlier argument that treating inputs to innovation as investment produces a Romer-
style framework in which revenue from the production of final output must be sufficient to cover 
the ―interest costs‖ of innovation.  These costs subtract from productivity as per equation (17) 
because they are, in fact, forgone final output.   
Second, theoretical models that incorporate markups usually follow Romer and impose 
intertemporal zero profits by setting the markup to one in steady-state equilibrium (e.g., 
Rotemberg and Woodford 1995).  The structure of our model also is consistent with using the 
                                                          
10
 The similarly defined magnitudes for the final output sector and the total economy are ,  ln ,  ln
Y Y Y Y
C F C F   
and   ,  ln ,  lnCF C F  , respectively, where ln (1 ) ln ln
R Y R N
Y Y
F s F s F      , and so on. 
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parameter   to incorporate the cost of commercializing R&D outcomes as a simple multiple of 
R&D (e.g., the intangible ―complementary‖ capital in Basu et al. 2004), in which case temporal 
zero profits is imposed while   is most assuredly not equal to one.11   
Finally, following standard practice, measured productivity growth ln measuredTFP  is given by 
the difference between the growth rate of final output,  lnY , and the growth of measured share-
weighted total factor inputs (that is, including the inputs used in the innovation sector), denoted 
as ln measuredF .   This quantity exceeds the competitive quantity ln F in the presence of 
innovator markups because some of the increment to revenue is used to cover markups.  We 
denote the real value of this increment by  , in which case the foregone growth in final output 
associated with markups on the conduct of R&D is written:   
                    
ln ln ln
                       ln ln
measured measuredTFP Y F
Y F
   
   
                                                         (19)     
Thus   must be added to the change in (upstream) factor  inputs valued at competitive factor 
prices to capture the full costs of the R&D ―overhead‖ borne by the downstream sector.   
Under steady-state conditions the growth rate of a capital stock is well approximated by the 
growth rate of real investment (Griliches 1980).  Let g be such a growth rate for real R&D 
investment and its stock.  As g approaches the real interest rate ρN, the investment share 
approaches the capital income share (Jorgenson 1966), i.e., we can write 
R N
Y Ys s  where  is a 
discrete-time version of the Griliches (1980) term that converts gross investment to income from 
accumulated net investments: 
 [( )(1 )] ( )
N R Rg g                                            (20) 
The term approaches one in the
N g  ―maximal consumption‖ steady state.   
                                                          
11
 A rationale for this interpretation is that the R&D data only cover costs of pursuing new scientific and engineering 
knowledge, and a ―successful‖ R&D outcome (a patent, say) does not necessarily imply immediate business 
viability, much less costless implementation.  Many new product development costs are not captured in the available 
R&D data because they are associated with activities considered to lack sufficient experimentation to be classified 
as R&D but are nonetheless an inseparable aspect of the ―value‖ of R&D. 
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Substituting 
N
Ys for 
R
Ys and ln N for ln
YR in equation (17) and then expanding the result 
using equations (16) and (19) yields the following: 
                 
ln ln (1 ) ln ln
                = ln (1 ) ln ln ln
                = ln ln ln ( 1) ln
                = ln ln
Y N Y N
Y Y
N Y N N N N
Y Y Y
N N N N
Y Y
measured N N
Y
TFP Y s F s N
Y s F s TFP s F
Y F s TFP s F
TFP s TFP
 
   
  

       
       
      
  
            (21) 
where ( 1) ln
N N
Ys F     , which goes to zero as   approaches one.   
Rearranging terms in the last line of equation (21) yields 
                      ln ln ln
measured Y N N
YTFP TFP s TFP                                             (22) 
which depicts an economy‘s measured productivity growth as an (approximate) Domar-weighted 
average (Domar 1961; Hulten 1978) of the productivities in its innovation and final output 
sectors.  The equation highlights our modelling of the knowledge production process (not just 
R&D spending) as an augmenter of final output productivity.  Augmentation depends on R&D 
spending and the productivity or ―success‖ of the R&D activity.   
3. Measurement 
Our approach is to formulate the empirical growth accounting counterpart to the theoretical 
model of the previous sections and then construct the terms on the right hand side of equation (8) 
to estimate price change for private R&D.  For this we need estimates of input shares and final 
output productivity that account appropriately for the contribution of R&D to economic growth.   
We cannot use the usual growth accounting terms because they are biased.  We thus face three 
central measurement challenges:  First, we need estimates of the unobserved final output 
productivity ( ln )
YTFP  i.e., productivity excluding the contribution of R&D.   Second, we need 
values for the unobserved capital income share of innovation assets (
R
Ys ).  Third, we need a value 
for the unobserved innovator markup.  These needs may be expressed in terms of available 
measurements and three parameters, ,  ,  and    , as follows: 
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ln * ln
*
* *
Y measured
R N
Y Y
N measured
Y
TFP TFP
s s
s


 
  


 (23) 
where  N measuredYs is the R&D intensity calculated using the cost data available from R&D surveys. 
We further note that values for the parameters  and    permit calculation of the producer 
markup of equation (10) as  1 (1 * * )N measuredYs    .
12
 
3.1 Obtaining values for ,  ,  and      
Equation (22) suggests that the variation in industry-level measured TFP growth rates and R&D 
intensities can be exploited to decompose measured productivity for an economy into a 
contribution from its final output sector and a contribution from its innovation sector.  In other 
words, assuming that downstream productivity does not vary with innovation intensity at the 
industry level, an industry dataset containing gross output-based TFP estimates for multiple 
industries
 
and corresponding industry counterparts
 
to 
N measured
Ys  from R&D surveys can be used to 
run the following regression:  
 ,, , , ,     .ln   
measuredmeasured N
i tG i t G i tTFP a b s e      
 (24) 
This regression determines a value for  .  Setting both  and  to one for the moment, the 
regression‘s estimated a is an estimate of ln YTFP and its estimated b is an estimate of 
ln NTFP .  Of course, the effects discerned by this regression will be only those due to 
differences in resources allocated to R&D, on average, in the period of estimation.  
Consequently, the regression is best implemented as a long-run relationship, i.e., as a quest for 
underlying trends in the two unobservable sector productivities, ln NTFP and ln YTFP . 
                                                          
12
 Producer markups so defined are still related to the price elasticity of demand for the underlying goods as in 
Romer—indeed, our model connects expenditures on innovation to customer demand in this way.  This is because 
when investments in innovation lead to products or brands with a high own-price elasticity of demand (think new 
Apple products vs. new brands of milk), ―market power‖ and expenses devoted to developing and marketing new 
products become associated with one another and vice versa. 
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A number of implementation issues nonetheless remain.  First, estimating ln YTFP  by a 
constant in a regression with data for multiple industries assumes that ln YTFP  is constant 
across industries (plus an error).  Determining productivity differences across industries is 
problematic, of course—indeed, a topic afield from the central purpose of this paper.  
Accordingly, to pursue the upstream/downstream decomposition of productivity, we continue 
with the simple logic of equation (24), that downstream productivity trends are constant across 
industries. 
Second, to capture long run relationships we might use data averaged over a long period but this 
gives us rather few observations.  An alternative to gain more observations would be to break the 
data into productivity episodes that, presumably, are roughly equal in terms of productivity 
growth.  There is of course a tension here, because the underlying relationships might be 
evolving over time, in which case additional controls will be needed to capture the appropriate 
trends.   
Third, the analysis must confront the fact that the conduct of R&D is concentrated in a handful of 
industries, i.e., that measured R&D must be but one aspect of innovation‘s contribution to 
economic growth.  Beyond the presence of R&D co-investments, in many advanced 
industrialized countries, large services industries (finance, distribution) contribute notably to 
economic growth but perform very little science-based R&D.  Modeling all industries using 
equation (24) may therefore prove problematic.  A related issue is that productivity growth for 
certain industries is poorly measured and including these observations may distort a regression‘s 
coefficient estimates.  
Finally, we need values for and   to implement the regression.  We are willing to employ the 
―maximal consumption‖ (i.e., 1  ) steady state assumption because the UK and many other 
advanced industrialized economies generally have stable industry-level R&D intensities.  But 
using the Romer zero intertemporal innovator profits (i.e., 1  ) assumption is problematic 
because single productivity episodes do not necessarily correspond to periods of zero innovator 
profits.   
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We therefore introduce a very practical reason for setting µ greater than one, namely, that the 
parameter places in-house R&D on the same footing with marketed R&D services.  The costs of 
R&D exchanged between R&D establishments classified in a different industry than the 
parent/owner firm were in fact ―marked up‖ in the US R&D satellite account for this reason 
(Moylan and Robbins 2007, p.52).  A related strategy is to use µ as a R&D co-investment 
multiple (see earlier discussion and footnote 11).   
Following Moylan/Robbins a markup margin can be obtained using the ratio of net operating 
surplus to gross output for the miscellaneous professional, scientific, and technical services 
industry; we estimate this ratio averages about .15 in the United States (implying an average 
innovator markup of 1.15).  Hulten and Hao (2008) studied six multinational pharmaceutical 
firms and estimated that the ―shadow‖ value of own-produced pharmaceutical R&D was 
50 percent greater than its cost (i.e., the innovator markup was 1.5) in the year they studied 
(2006).  They also estimated that the increment to organizational capital was 30 percent of the 
value of own-produced R&D (i.e., the R&D co-investment multiple is 1.3).  
Although the Hulten/Hao results suggest that in some years some industries have large markups, 
we proceed by applying the same markup to all industries in all years.  We therefore use 1.15 as 
our central estimate for µ—the value needed to put in-house R&D on the same footing with 
marketed R&D services—but examine results for higher values in light of Hulten/Hao. 
3.2 A productivity decomposition for the UK 
We constructed an industry dataset that integrates gross output-based TFP estimates with R&D 
performance statistics for 29 UK market sector industries from 1985 to 2005.  The major data 
sources used were EUKLEMS (March 2008) and the ONS R&D survey (BERD).  A few of the 
29 industries are nonperformers according to BERD and certain others have very low R&D 
intensities (for further information see the appendix).  Accordingly, summary statistics for entire 
market sector are shown on the first three lines of table 1, followed by statistics excluding the 
nonperformers, industries in the lowest R&D intensity quartile, and industries with problematic 
TFP estimates. (The lowest quartile R&D performers are industries with 
, .003
N
G is  ). 
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Line 1 of the table shows the aggregate productivity of the UK market sector, and line 2 reports a 
simple average of its constituent industry productivities.  For all items, statistics for the entire 
period and for two sub-periods with 1995 as the break year are shown.  As may be seen, both 
aggregate TFP growth and average industry TFP growth decelerates 0.2 percentage points 
between the two periods.  When problematic industry TFP estimates and the lowest quartile of 
R&D performers are excluded, average industry productivity growth still decelerates (line 4).   
 
Table 1.  UK market sector productivity and R&D summary statistics  
 
1985 to 2005 1985 to 1995 1995 to 2005 
All market sector industries:    
1. 
,1,
* ln *100measuredi G ii J Domar TFP 
1 
2.22 2.33 2.10 
2. 
,1,
(1/ ) ln *100measuredG ii JJ TFP    
 1.05 1.17 .93 
3. 
,1,
(1/ ) *100NG ii JJ s  
2 
1.60 1.69 1.53 
Excl. lowest R&D quartile and industries 
with problematic TFP estimates:
 
   
4.
 
,1,
(1/ ) ln *100measuredG ii JJ TFP 
 1.25 1.39 1.06 
5. 
,1,
(1/ ) *100NG ii JJ s  
2 
2.69 2.45 3.00 
Memos:    
6. Nominal R&D spending
 
5.3 6.4 4.2 
7. Real R&D spending (conventional)
3
  
 
1.8 2.0 1.7 
8. R&D spending/GVA (  N measuredYs )
4 1.93 2.05 1.82 
Notes— TFP growth rates are estimated using the dual approach, and all growth rates are calculated using log 
differences.  Aggregation in lines 1-3 is over 29 market sector industries excluding the R&D services industry, 
whose R&D is allocated to purchasing industries. For industries included in line 4 and 5, see the appendix. 
1. The Domar weight is calculated as industry gross output relative to market sector value added.   
2.  Average R&D intensity of industries with µ=1.15. 
3.  Deflated using the GDP deflator. 
4.  GVA is for the market sector. 
 
Line 3 summarizes the µ=1.15 R&D intensity of market sector industries.  This statistic trails 
downward, as do the more familiar statistics, R&D relative to GDP or R&D relative to market 
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sector GVA (the memo item on line 8).  When the lowest quartile of R&D performers and 
nonperformers are excluded, however, the average R&D intensity of industries trends up (line 5).  
Underlying the divergence is the fact that value added in major R&D-performing industries is 
falling as a share of total GDP.  While this suggests conventional GDP-based science policy 
benchmarks for R&D are somewhat ill focused, more relevant to this study is the fact that the 
conventional real R&D spending measure—shown on line 7—grows rather slowly (under 2 
percent per year).  
To estimate equation (24) we use data in two cross-sections corresponding to the two sub-periods 
of table 1.  The upper panel of figure 1 shows a scatter plot of the 58 µ=1.15 data points that we 
have available for estimating the regression coefficients.  As may be seen, there are notable 
outliers, and a regression using all of these data points lacks robustness. Nonetheless, the figure 
confirms that the conduct of UK R&D is concentrated in a handful of industry sectors.  It also 
suggests an underlying linear relationship between total factor productivity and R&D intensity.   
The bottom panel of figure 1 shows a plot of the 34 data points that we have after excluding 
outliers and the bottom quartile of R&D performers.  As may be seen the exclusion of the latter 
mainly reduces the mass (rather than the dispersion) of the data points at low R&D intensities 
while exclusion of the former appears to sharpen the underlying linear relationship. The bottom 
panel also distinguishes pre- and post-1995 data points and shows that the lower average industry 
productivity growth in the post-1995 period appears in industries with very high R&D shares.  
Using the dataset plotted in the lower panel, we experimented with estimation technique (fixed 
versus random effects, OLS versus robust methods) and all methods yielded identical estimates 
of a and b .  We also explored weighted LS (with Domar weights reflecting each industry‘s 
contribution to overall productivity) and found it lacked robustness.  We then examined the 
sensitivity of the regression‘s estimates of   on the value assumed for the innovator markup and 
tested whether the estimates were stable across sub-periods.  
The central findings are set out in table 2.  Estimation is by random effects with robust standard 
errors.  Results are unweighted and relevant coefficients are estimated precisely.  Column 1 and 
column 2 differ only according to the value for   used to calculate the innovation intensity.  As 
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may be seen, the value for  affects the estimated coefficient on the innovation intensity (the 
estimate of upstream productivity) while the estimated constant term is unaffected.  In fact, the 
column 2 coefficient on 
,
N
G is is 15 percent smaller than the column 1 coefficient because the 
observations used in the column 2 regression are precisely 15 percent larger by construction.  
This suggests that estimates of  using the constant term from regressions such as equation (24) 
are unaffected by the assumption for the innovator markup (nor, by the same reasoning, the 
assumption for ).   
The basic point illustrated by columns 1 and 2 of table 2 then is that measured TFP change is an 
average of a contribution from very substantial productivity growth in the upstream R&D sector 
(the coefficient on 
,
N
G is ) and an order-of-magnitude slower growth in the downstream production 
sector (the coefficient on the constant term).  Indeed, even though the share of resources devoted 
to R&D is relatively small in the UK (recall the value of  N measuredYs from table 1), the regressions 
suggest that the conduct of R&D has contributed substantially to UK productivity growth.  
The estimates of   shown in the table memos imply that the growth in UK R&D productivity 
accounted for 25 to 30 percent (1- ) of average industry TFP growth for industries in the upper 
3 quartiles of R&D performing industries.  But columns 4 and 5 suggest that R&D productivity 
contributed much less in the second sub-period of our sample than in the first.  The regressions 
with sub-period dummy variables detect a drop in the growth of R&D productivity, whereas 
estimated operational productivity grows at a constant 0.9 percent annual rate throughout 
(column 4). 
In what follows, we examine R&D price change calculated using the estimates shown in both 
columns 2 and 4, and in the final analysis, we settle on using column 2‘s constant value for  .  
We do this to keep the analysis simple and to present a transparent application of the downstream 
approach.  We also believe additional research and more data points are needed to determine the 
presence (and size, if present) of a break in UK R&D productivity after 1995. 
24 
 
 
 
Table 2. Decomposition of UK productivity change, 1985 to 2005 
 Estimation by Random Effects 
(Robust standard errors in parentheses) 
 Dependent variable:  
,ln
measured
G iTFP  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
Independent variables µ=1.00 µ=1.15 µ=1.15 µ=1.15 µ=1.15 
           
  Constant   .0091***   .0091***   .0107***   .0089***   .0080*** 
 (.0017) (.0017) (.0019) (.0015) (.0019) 
   
 
  
 
,
N
G is    .1431***   .1244***   .1318***   .2258***   .2423*** 
 (.0505) (.0439) (.0482) (.0482) (.0544) 
 
   
  
 1995-2005 dummy -- -- -.0040* --      .0002 
 
  
(.0023)  (.0030) 
 
   
  
, * 1995 2005 dummy
N
G is   -- -- -- -.1852*** -.2222*** 
 
   
(.0541) (.0771) 
Memos:    
          .73 .73 .70 .71 .76 
       1  (1985 - 1995)    
.77 .63 .57 
       2  (1995 - 2005)    
.63 .83 .94 
Note--Robust standard errors in parentheses.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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3.3 Calculating price indexes for R&D 
With key parameters specified, we are very close to taking equation (8) to the data.  We still need 
the weights i  to be applied to each industry‘s estimated price change in the overall price index 
for R&D—recall that they were left unspecified in section 2—and we need to develop an 
approach to computation.  Dividing by very small industry-level 
,
R
G is  terms as per equation (8) is 
generally not viable, and most integrated R&D/productivity datasets will have many such terms. 
We proceed as follows:  We first calculate the numerator of equation (8) for each industry as 
  , , , , , , ,ln  (1 ) ln  + ln
GO R measured measured
i t G i t G i t G i tP s C TFP      (25) 
where 
,ln
GO
i tP is the change in the downstream industry‘s final output price (its gross output 
price) and 
, ,ln
measured
G i tC is the change in its share-weighted input costs (labor, capital, and 
materials).
13
  Ignoring time subscripts, for each industry, equation (25) gives 
, , ln
R R
G i t is P  , i.e., 
the contribution of the change in R&D asset rental prices to the change in industry i‘s final 
output price.  The overall contribution of the change knowledge asset prices to final output prices 
is obtained by aggregating these industry-level contributions using Domar weights.    
We approximate Domar weights by the ratio of industry gross output ( )jGO  to sector value 
added ( )sGVA .  The sum of the industry-level contributions is then given by: 
 
,
1,
ln  lnR R R RiY G i i
i J S
GO
s P s P
GVA
    (26) 
where 
R
Ys is the aggregate knowledge capital income share.  From (23) 
R
Ys  is given by—and 
calculated as: 
 R NY Ss P N GVA . (27) 
                                                          
13
 The source for these items is the March 2008 version of the UK EUKLEMS dataset. We experimented with 
calculating 
,
ln
Y
G i
C  directly by subtracting off R&D workers, materials, and capital inputs calculated using data 
from the BERD survey, but—lacking independent information on input prices--the approach did not yield measures 
that differed materially from using 
, ,
(1 ) ln .
R measured
G i G i
s C   
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The division of equation (26) by equation (27) yields an expression for aggregate R&D price 
change.  The result also reveals three features of the downstream approach.  The first concerns its 
computation.  Namely, the change in the R&D asset price can be computed as follows: 
,
1,
ln  lnR R Ri G i iN
i J
GO
P s P
P N
      (28) 
i.e., by weighting each industry‘s contribution by industry gross output relative to aggregate 
R&D capital income.  This does not involve division by very small industry R&D intensities. 
The second is that the final price index calculated on the basis of (28) does not depend on 
assumptions for .  Substitution from (23) yields the equivalent expression, 
,
1,
ln  lnR N Ri G i iN
i J
GO
P s P
P N
      (29) 
which does not involve the parameter .  Although this  -independence result will not hold 
when industry-specific values for   apply, it nonetheless suggests that pinning down   is not a 
first order concern when using the downstream approach to construct a price index for R&D. 
Finally, a third feature is that further simplification (substitution of N i iP N GO for ,
N
i Gs ) reveals 
that the implicit weight applied to each industry‘s R&D asset price is N NiP N P N , the industry‘s 
share of total R&D investment.  Therefore, when equation (29) is used to calculate a price index 
for R&D, the result is formulaically equivalent to equation (8) where the i  weights are each 
industry‘s share of total private R&D.  (This result supports BEA‘s choice of weights for its 
―output-based‖ R&D price index.) 
The results of proceeding with the above computations are shown in table 3.  The first two 
columns are benchmarks that correspond to two common national accounting practices.  The first 
ascribes all productivity change to the downstream sector, or equivalently, it assumes R&D 
productivity shows no change.  This produces the national accountants‘ ―input-cost‖ price index, 
and as may be seen in column 1, it increases 4.0 percent per year.  This is a faster rate of increase 
than the 3.5 percent per year change in the UK GDP price index.   
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 Table 3.  R&D price change according to assumptions for downstream productivity change ( ln ).
YTFP  
 
ln YTFP     
Period 
.ln
[ 1]
measTFP



 
,
ln
[ 1 (1 )]
N
R
G i
TFP
s

 
 
]
Estimated 
[  
 
1 2[ ]
Estimated 
,  
 
Memos: 
Column (3) 
with 
1.3   
R&D 
weighted 
output price 
change 
 (1) (2)            (3)
1,2 
           (4)
1,3
 (5)
 
(6) 
1. 1985-1995 6.0 4.2 -9.2 -14.7 -8.4 3.6 
2. 1995-2005 2.0  .8 -5.8 -3.0 -5.5  .7 
3. 1985-2005 4.0 2.5 -7.5 -8.8 -7.0 2.1 
Notes—Recall ln / ln
Y measured
TFP TFP    and (1 ) ln / ln
R N measured
Y
s TFP TFP    where ln NTFP  is upstream 
productivity change.   Columns (1) through (4)  use 1.15  .   
1.  For industries with problematic TFP estimates as well as those in the lower R&D quartile, changes in operational and 
R&D productivity are assumed to be identical (i.e., that ln ln
N Y
TFP TFP   ). 
2.  The estimated   is from column 2 of table 2. 
3.  The estimated 
1 2
,  are from column 4 of table 2.  
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The second column shows the result of assuming that the change in operational productivity and 
R&D productivity are identical, akin to national accountants substituting average measured 
productivity in market services for ―hard-to-measure‖ or nonmarket services, such as R&D.  This 
implies there are neither spillovers from public R&D nor private appropriated returns to 
investments in product and process innovation.  In this scenario, the R&D price index increases 
2-1/2 percent per year, less than the input-cost index and similar to the BEA-style R&D weighted 
output price index shown in column 6. 
Columns 3 and 4 show the results of using estimated values for downstream vs. upstream 
productivity from the regressions the shown in columns 2 and 4 of table 2, respectively.  As may 
be seen, the impact of attributing returns to the conduct of R&D is substantial.  The price indexes 
in columns 3 and 4 fall 7.5 percent and 8.8 percent per year, respectively.  The results for sub-
periods are very sensitive to the shift in the value for theta, however, suggesting that the 
productivity decomposition parameter is of first order importance to determining the magnitude 
of R&D price change.  By contrast, the results in column 5—where the innovator margin is 
doubled—suggest rather less sensitivity to this parameter.  
In interpreting the estimates shown in columns 3 and 4, note that the overall assumed fraction of 
measured productivity growth attributed to the conduct of R&D reflects more than the 
assumption for   that is applied to the upper three quartiles of R&D performing industries.  The 
overall fraction also reflects the ln lnN YTFP TFP    assumption used for the lower quartile 
(and nonperformers and industries with problematic TFP measures).  For example, when .73 is 
used to decompose productivity change for the major performers, the value for theta averaged 
over all industries,   (unweighted), is .84—implying that the conduct of R&D accounted for 
16 percent (not 27 percent) of average industry TFP growth in the UK during the 1985 to 2005 
period. 
In keeping with our earlier caution against using the literal results of the break-adjusted 
productivity estimates, our preferred results from table 3 are those in column 3.  The annual 
changes in this index are plotted in the upper panel of figure 2, along with components of its 
price dual (price change = cost change - productivity change), where cost change is the input cost 
of R&D and productivity is a residual including reductions due to innovator markups.  The 
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resulting real growth rate of R&D spending is shown in the bottom panel of figure 2; it grows 
15.6 percent per year in the first period, 9.9 percent in the second, and 12.7 percent per year 
overall.   
The results shown in figure 2 are the central results of this paper.  Their sensitivity to the 
decomposition parameter   is illustrated in table 4.  The table shows changes in the R&D price 
index ( ln )
NP , the real growth of R&D ( ln N or g ), and the associated   for all industries 
according to a range of values for 
, for industries with .003
R
G is  .  All estimates in table 4 imply 
much faster growth of real R&D (line 3) than conventional estimates based on the GDP deflator 
(table 1, line 7). 
Table 4.  UK R&D price change for a range of values of  , 1985-2005 
1. 
, if .003
R
G is    .60 .70 .75 .80 .90 
2. ln NP  -13.0 -8.8 -6.7 -4.6 -.4 
3. ln  (or )N g  18.3 14.1 12.0 9.9 5.6 
4. , all industries  .76 .82 .85 .88 .94 
Note—Figures are calculated assuming 1.15  , 1  .  The variation in  applies to productivity of 
major R&D performers only.  
 
Applying the approximation,
Ng  , the table‘s values for real investment growth also are seen 
as suggestive of the range for the rates of return to R&D that inhere in our price estimates.
14
  It is 
                                                          
14
  Indeed one might ask how the estimates in tables 3 and 4 relate to the literature on returns to R&D as most 
recently surveyed in Hall, Mairesse, and Mohen (2009), hereafter HMM.  This literature runs a regression similar to 
ours.  HMM point out that a regression for estimating the rate of return to R&D must use an ―adjusted TFP‖ that has 
been calculated after subtracting R&D factor inputs.  Productivity growth so calculated equals sY
RΔlnRY  in our 
notation, and regressing it on  sY
N 
 yields a coefficient that is related to the rate of return to R&D, namely, 
g[(ρN+δR)(1+g)]/(g+δR).   (Due to the presence of a discrete time term in (1+g), this is not quite what HMM obtain 
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difficult to say how our real investment growth rates line up with the results in the literature that 
estimates a rate of return to R&D because that literature is not at all definitive—indeed, it has 
produced results for the UK that range from 10 to 70 percent (Hall, Marisee, and Mohen 2009).  
From this perspective, the range of the estimates shown in table 4 is relatively narrow and our 
central estimate appears rather reasonable. 
3.4 Implications 
We now turn to gauging the importance of our new R&D price index.  As depicted so far, the 
measured economy does not capitalize investments in innovation and track knowledge capital as 
a macroeconomic statistic.  But when national accountants move to recognize R&D spending as 
investment, in our simple model (a closed economy, now with no intermediates) both aggregate 
final demand and aggregate industry value added will include the output of the innovation sector. 
Under capitalization, real GDP (denoted by Q ) is thus the sum of each sector‘s output 
( )Q Y N  15 and aggregate productivity is given by 
                                     ln (1 ) ln lnQ N Y N NQ QTFP s TFP s TFP                            (30) 
where / ( )N N Y NQs P N P Y P N  .  As may be seen, this differs only slightly from the expression 
derived for productivity growth without capitalization, equation (22).
16
  The conceptual basis for 
the similarity in TFP growth before and after capitalization of R&D is, in fact, the premise of this 
paper—that the impact of the conduct of R&D on productivity is already in measured 
productivity.  By contrast, the capitalization of R&D does produce visible changes in the growth 
of real output and output per hour because real GDP with our price index for R&D includes a 
component that is growing 12.7 percent per year. 
These propositions are illustrated in table 5, which shows the growth in UK output per hour and 
TFP before and after capitalization of R&D.  As may be seen little or no effect is discerned on 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
in equation (5) of their paper but our derivation is similar.)  Substituting our expression for τ, the rate-of-return-
approach regression is seen to yield a coefficient on sY
N
 that equals gτ, which approaches ρN as τ approaches one.  
15
 This of course is a simplified expression as summation in real terms does not hold under chain-weighting. 
16
 The new trend in measured TFP change will be slightly lower than the rate prior to R&D capitalization because, 
arithmetically, the first term in equation (30) vs. equation (22) is smaller by s
N
Q Δ lnTFP
Y 
(two small numbers 
multiplied by each other) and the second has a slightly smaller weight (i.e., s
N
Q < s
N
Y ). 
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TFP growth (line 2b) whereas the growth of output per hour is noticeably affected (line 1b).  
Moreover, the bulk of the impact on output per hour stems from the R&D deflator (line 1c), not 
from the addition of new nominal investment to GDP.  Finally, as shown on line 3, with our 
downstream deflator, estimated real stocks of R&D assets grow rapidly, especially from 1985 to 
1995.
17
  All told, stocks grow at a rapid clip, and R&D capital deepening (line 3a) contributes 
.25 percentage points to the growth in UK market sector output per hour.   
 
Table 5.  Growth in output per hour, TFP, and R&D stocks, UK market sector  
 
1985 to 2005 1985 to 1995 1995 to 2005 
1.    Output per hour, R&D capitalized 2.9 3.0 2.8 
1a        Without R&D capitalization 2.7 2.7 2.6 
1b        Difference due to capitalization
1
 .22 .30 .14 
1c           Contribution of deflator .16 .21 .12 
2.    TFP, R&D capitalized 2.2 2.2 2.1 
2a        Without R&D capitalization 2.2 2.3 2.1 
2b        Difference due to capitalization
2
 -.05 -.06 -.05 
3.   Real stocks of R&D assets 12.7 14.2 11.1 
3a       Contrib. of R&D capital deepening
3
 .25 .33 .17 
Note—Growth rates are annualized and calculated using log differences.  Italicized entries are percentage points. 
1. Line 1 less line 1a.   
2. Line 2 less line 2a. 
3. Contribution to the growth in output per hour, line 1. 
4. Conclusion 
This paper showed that aggregate business output may be modeled as emanating from two 
sectors: one, the aggregate behavior of business functions devoted to innovation and R&D, and 
the other, an operations and/or producing sector consisting of all other business functions.  The 
model is very simple, assuming only the following: the innovation sector is entirely upstream of 
the operations sector; the operations (or ―downstream‖) sector produces all final output and is a 
                                                          
17
  The stocks are calculated using a depreciation rate of 15 percent (the rate used by the US BEA) and an initial 
value as in Griliches (1980).  See also equation (3) in Sliker (2007, p. 3). 
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price-taker for inputs; and the aggregate value of final output equals the sum of all factor 
payments by business.   
The recursive nature of the model‘s price-dual relationships was used to show how the price of 
commercially-produced knowledge is related to innovator market power and downstream output 
prices, factor costs, and productivity.  We related this ―downstream‖ approach to measuring 
R&D price change to other methods under consideration for calculating an investment price 
index for R&D in national accounts and found that these methods tend to embody unrealistically 
weak assumptions for R&D productivity (or implausibly strong innovator market power). 
The model, its parameterization via productivity decomposition, and use of price-dual solutions 
have ample precedence in the literature:  The model is related both to Romer (1990) and the 
intangible capital literature (e.g., Corrado, Hulten, and Sichel 2009); the productivity 
decomposition is related to the literature on estimating returns to R&D (e.g., Griliches 1980, 
Mansfield 1980, and Schankerman 1981); and price-dual growth accounting relationships were 
exploited for productivity analysis by Oliner and Sichel (2000), among others. 
When our downstream approach is applied to the UK data, we found that UK R&D investment 
prices fell 7.5 percent per year from 1985 to 2005, and that R&D capital deepening contributed 
notably to the growth in output per hour.  The precise fall in a R&D price index obtained using 
the downstream approach depends on a decomposition of measured productivity between a 
contribution from R&D and from all other factors, but our central finding of falling R&D prices 
is robust relative to all that we know from the empirical R&D literature (spillovers, above 
average rates of return, etc.)—and stands in stark contrast to the assumption of rising R&D 
prices in all other work on the topic.   
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               Figure 1   
        UK Industry Productivity and R&D Intensity 
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Figure 2 
   R&D Price Index and Real R&D Spending (percent change) 
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APPENDIX 
 
R&D and TFP industry-level data 
We have four industry-level data sources.  First, we have the UK R&D spending data from 
BERD, which surveys own-account R&D spending by firms and reports R&D for 32 product 
groups that generally correspond to industry groups.
1
  Second, we have the UK EUKLEMS 
March 2008 dataset covering the period through 2005, the latest data as of this writing.  This 
dataset reports capital input and gross output-based TFP estimates for 26 market sector industries 
along with prices and quantities of output and labor and material input for 72 industries.
2
  Third, 
we have capital services data from the UK ONS at a more disaggregate level than available from 
EUKLEMS (e.g., motor vehicles and other transport, rather than total transport equipment).  We 
use these capital services estimates along with the other information from EUKLEMS to 
calculate TFPs for 5 additional industries.  Fourth, we have the UK supply-use (IO) tables, for 
more than 100 industries from 1992 to 2006.  
After merging the BERD data with the EUKLEMS, ONS and IO data and aggregating certain 
industries, we have a data set for 29 market industries from 1985 to 2005.  The industries are 
listed in table A1.  Note that, due to disclosure issues, we do not have separate capital stocks for 
pharmaceuticals—the largest R&D performer in the UK—and therefore are forced to work with 
the aggregate chemicals sector.  The list shown in table A1 also excludes the R&D services 
industry because its R&D is allocated to using industries based on input-output relationships.   
The lower quartile bound 
The allocation of R&D conducted in the R&D services industry to using industries causes three 
industries that do not conduct scientific R&D according to BERD to show non-zero R&D 
intensities, albeit very small ones.  These industries are financial services, hotels and restaurants, 
and other social, community and personal services.  Then we calculate the cutoff point used to 
                                                          
1
  Because individual companies can perform R&D for a range of products, the correspondence must be regarded as 
an approximation, however. 
2
 The market sector in EUKLEMS is NACE sectors A-Kpt plus O and P.  We exclude P (private households) and 
work with NACE sectors A-Kpt plus O.  Kpt is sector K excluding industry 70 (real estate). 
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determine the lower quartile of R&D performers, intensities for these nonperformers are 
excluded from the calculation.   
The cutoff point we use is .003 (of gross output), and it is calculated as the lower quartile bound 
using the 1985-2005 average ( 1.15,  1.0)    value for  for the 26 R&D-performing 
industries shown in table A1, i.e., all industries except financial services, hotels and restaurants, 
and other social, community and personal services.  Another way of thinking about this cutoff is 
that the lower 1/3 percentile of the industries shown in table A1 is dropped; the two approaches 
yield the same results.   
Observations in the productivity regression 
To determine the observations used in the productivity decomposition regression, we first 
exclude the nonperformers and the lower quartile of R&D performers.  Then we test for outliers.   
We apply the cutoff to each sub-period separately; this procedure leaves us with 38 observations.  
We note that two industries that make the cutoff on the basis of averages for the whole period do 
not make the cutoff in the second sub-period (utilities and miscellaneous business services).  
Also, two industries that fail to make the cutoff on the basis of averages for the whole period do 
make the cutoff in the first period (mining and other manufacturing).  Thus after applying the 
cutoff, our observations consist of 21 observations on the first period and 17 on the second. 
Of these 38 observations, the negative observations for computer and software services in the 
pre-1995 period and petroleum refining in the post-1995  period are detected as outliers and 
excluded from the regression analysis.  The observations for the post and telecommunications 
industry also are excluded.  Research has shown that quality change in the capital equipment 
used in this industry is substantially understated (Doms and Forman 2005, Doms 2005, Byrne 
and Corrado 2011), and we believe the industry‘s TFP estimates are overstated.   For the U.S. 
broadcasting and telecommunications industry (NAICS 513), the overstatement of TFP growth 
due to mis-measured capital is estimated to be about 50 percent of the change based on published 
data (Corrado 2011).  This type of measurement problem is not covered by the analysis in 
section 2.4 and, accordingly, the observations are dropped for our regression analysis.  All told, 
the regressions use 34 observations. 
sG , i
R
  
     Table A1.  R&D Intensities by industry, 1985-2005 average
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)
Memos:
Number  Name
NACE code
R&D 
Intensity
Col (2) 
with 
mu=1.15
in upper 
2/3 
percentile 
of R&D 
intensitie
s (> .003)
included 
in 
regression 
(first 
period, 
second 
period, 
both)
Source 
for capital 
services 
estimates
1 Agriculture A,B 0.0044 0.0051 * both EUKLEMS
2 Extractive industries (mining) C 0.0025 0.0029 first EUKLEMS
3 Food, beverage, and tobacco products 15, 16 0.0039 0.0045 * both EUKLEMS
4 Textiles, clothing and leather products 17-19 0.0018 0.0021  EUKLEMS
5 Pulp & paper, printing; wood products 20-22 0.0011 0.0013  EUKLEMS
6 Refined petroleum and related products 23 0.0156 0.0180 * first EUKLEMS
7 Chemicals and chemical products 24 0.0721 0.0829 * both EUKLEMS
8 Rubber and plastics 25 0.0043 0.0050 * both EUKLEMS
9 Nonmetallic mineral products 26 0.0053 0.0061 * both EUKLEMS
10 Basic metals 27 0.0035 0.0041 * both ONS
11 Fabricated metals 28 0.0035 0.0040 * both ONS
12 Machinery and equip. 29 0.0238 0.0274 * both EUKLEMS
13 Computers and office machinery 30 0.0158 0.0181 * both ONS
14 Electrical machinery and apparatus 31 0.0407 0.0468 * both ONS
15 Communications equipment 32 0.0589 0.0677 * both ONS
16 Instruments 33 0.0401 0.0462 * both ONS
17 Motor vehicles and parts 34 0.0278 0.0319 * both ONS
18 Other transport equipment 35 0.0676 0.0777 * both ONS
19 Other manufacturing 36-37 0.0026 0.0030 first EUKLEMS
20 Utilities E 0.0035 0.0040 * first EUKLEMS
21 Construction F 0.0003 0.0003  EUKLEMS
22 Wholesale and retail trade G 0.0002 0.0003  EUKLEMS
23 Hotels and restaurants H 0.0001 0.0001  EUKLEMS
24 Transportion and storage services 60-63 0.0004 0.0005  EUKLEMS
25 Telecommunications and postal services 64 0.0157 0.0181 *  EUKLEMS
26 Financial services J 0.0002 0.0002  EUKLEMS
27 Misc Bus Services Kpt 0.0027 0.0031 *  first ONS
28 Computer and software services 72 0.0461 0.0531 * second ONS
29 Social, community, and personal srvs. O 0.0007 0.0008  EUKLEMS
   Note--R&D intensity is relative to industry gross output.  R&D performed in the R&D services industry is
     allocated to using industries.
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